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ANCIENT WRITS AND MODERN CAUSES OF ACTION
In a stimulating article recently published in this Journal Professor
0. L. McCaskill condemns the conception of the code cause of action
held by Pomeroy, Bliss, Phillips, and others, including the present
writer, and sets forth a novel view which he frankly admits to be
"utterly at variance with that of standard text writers, and at variance
with what courts profess to follow."' Space is here lacking for a full
discussion of the ingenious argument, presented as it is with the




highest dialectic skill; but since it is believed that his position is quite
at variance also with desirable pleading conceptions, an immediate
caveat seems desirable.
A summary of the position of the learned author will hardly do jus-
tice to it; and yet he has, I believe, made his fundamental position clear
even if the details are not so certain. :First, the concept of the cause
of action as an aggregate of operative facts, larger or smaller as con-
venience or law dictates, giving ground for judicial interference,2 is
arraigned as indefinite. Then constructively it is asserted that the
cause is to be determined by the right to be enforced, the right in turn is
to be determined by -the remedy, and the remedy in turn by its historical
origin.3  And so we have the modern code cause going back directly
to the ancient writs of the common law and the former bill in equity.
Thus, to determine the extent of a cause of action for "legal" relief,
we are to look to the limits sets by the analogous old common law writ.
Further, while law and equity may touch elbows in the same lawsuit,
each is to preserve its ancient independent form within the confines
of a separate cause of action. This novel view of the code reform is
supported apparently on these grounds: that it is an immutable deduc-
tion from fixed and absolute premises, and that it makes the concept
of the cause of action definite and certain.4
Since words are but counters for expressing ideas, the latter are
the more important. The words employed to convey ideas are not
themselves fixed and invariable things; they serve their purpose when
they get the ideas over to minds other than those which originated the
ideas. Hence we look not so much for a previously established or
invariable meaning to words as for -the most convenient meaning to
convey our ideas. Where the words are used in a statute, we should
at least not do violence to the ideas of the statute makers and must
therefore put a reasonable meaning to the words they used. Since in
our present inquiry we do not find these ideas ascertained and settled
beyond possible question, we cannot say that the words in dispute have
an immutable meaning. We might even urge the discarding of the
term cause of action, on the ground that usage has been so variable,
except that it is employed in the code and that moreover it has become
'See Clark, The Code Cause of Action (1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 817.
Professor McCaskill is quite correct in pointing out the fundamental similarity
of Pomeroy's views and those of mine, as well as those of Judges Bliss and
Phillips. The form of definition employed by Pomeroy seems to me objection-
able, although I accept what I think is the meaning behind it.
'See especially McCaskill, op. cit. mupra note i, at p. 638.
'Incidentally it is argued that flexibility is secured since the cause as thus
defined is a much smaller unit than under current definitions. If it be "flexi-
bility" to do away with the rules against splitting a cause of action and of res
adftedicata, perhaps this must be conceded. This actually seems to be his position.
See e. g., McCaskill, op. cit. supra note i, at pp. 648-651; also discussion herein-
after.
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a part of so may pleading rules as to make such discarding incon-
venient. We might urge that its meaning must in each case be deter-
mined by the particular use to which it is then being put, except that,
as the writers all seem to concede, there is a general idea behind all
the surface variations in use. Our real problem, therefore, is to give
a content to the term definite enough to indicate this general
idea, flexible enough to be convenient in the various uses we make
of it, and accurate enough to do no violence to the ideas and plans of
the code makers.
My first objection to the suggested definition is that I believe it to
be opposed to the ideas and plans of the code makers. True, they
expressed these only in a broad, general way, since naturally they could
not foresee all details of the operation of the change they were
effecting. But broadly speaking their purpose seems clear. In fact,
it was definitely expressed, as I have attempted to show elsewhere.5
They planned to do away with the old common law forms of action,
to "blend" law and equity together by abolishing the distinctions not
alone between the forms of actions at law and suits in equity, but also
between the actions and suits themselves, to adopt the main features
of equity pleading for the new procedure, and to provide a method of
pleading facts only, leaving the application of the proper rule of law
to be made by the court.8 The position of the learned author seems
to be that they could not have intended to do these things, no matter
what they said, because (a) the common law system was a good
system anyhow, in the manner in which it presented the issues to
court and jury, and hence they must have wanted to continue it, and
(b) the constitutional right to a jury trial still obtains in "law" cases.
This conclusion first being reached, the code is then carefully examined
and every detail in any way backing such conclusion is emphasized
and elaborated with the true skill of a trained advocate. The beauty
of the argument is to be admired; nevertheless it must be recognized
as an argument rather than a scientific investigation of the codifiers'
plans. One example of the method must suffice. It is skillfully
Clark, TIto Union of Law and Equity (1925) 25 CoL. L. REv. i; Clark, op.
cit. supra note 2, at p. 816, referring to First Report of the Commissioners on
Practice and Pleadings, N. Y. 1848, 145; ibid. supplement, 3, and passim. Nearly
all the Codes provide that the sufficiency of the pleadings shall be determined only
by the rules prescribed in the Code, abolishing forms of pleading heretofore
existing. First Report, N. Y. 1848, sec. 118; Calif. C. C. P. 1923, sec. 4, 42i;
Idaho, Comp. Sts. 1919, sec. 6684; Minn. Gen. Sts. 1913, sec. 7752.
' Clark, op. cit. supra note 5. Mr. McCaskill has an extended argument against
the well-nigh universally accepted code principle that the remedy. the prayer for
relief, forms no part of the cause of action, a principle following directly from
the code provision that if the defendant has answered the court may grant the
plaintiff relief other than that asked for. N. Y. C. P. A. 1921, sec. 479; First
Report, sec. 231; Clark, op. cit. supra note 5, at p. 4. His position is that the
right enforced in the cause is determined only by its appropriate historical
remedy, a position the doubtfulness of which is hereinafter suggested.
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developed that the classes of permissive joinder of code causes were
apparently obtained largely by combining certain of the old common
law forms. From this it is argued that there is shown a preservation
of the old forms. But the really important thing is not that the codi-
fiers worked with the mental background that they had, and that they
employed old common law and equity concepts, but that they attempted
to cut across them.
7
My second criticism is that the claimed benefits of the new definition,
even the one of definiteness and certainty, do not exist. The old equity
cause is to exist as before; and here it is admitted that the extent
of the equity cause was determined not by arbitrary rule but by prin-
ciples of administrative convenience (that is, substantially the method
urged for the code cause by -the present writer in the criticised article)."
Further the idea that a definite and clear-cut right was isolated and
enforced in each common law action is an illlusion. Even the bound-
aries of the old actions became shadowy, as witness -the attempt to
established the dividing line between trespass and caseY The pleader to
a considerable extent had the option of determining the extent of his
right as in the case of trespass quare clausum where consequential
damages may also be claimed.10 This variableness of the common
law remedies available in one action is really admitted by our author;
and ultimately he comes to the conclusion that any variation in the
operative facts establishes a new right and hence a new cause of
action."1
Much is made of the required separate statement of causes and defenses.
This requirement, narrowly applied, is simply a nuisance. Cf. infra note i9.
But applying the fact test that defenses- or causes are distinct when they refer
to essentially different past happenings, it does not seem improper. Thus the facts
of the defense of release are entir.ely distinct from those of the statute of
limitations and the separate statement is logical and helpful.
8 Clark, op. cit. supra note 2.
'Cf. Loubz v. Hafner (1827, N. C.) i Dev. 185; Sunderland, Caseir on Common
Law Pleading (1914) 7, 42.
1 0Ditcham v. Bond (1814, K. B.) 2 Maule & S. 436. As to trespass with a
continuando for mesne profits, see Smith v. Wunderlich (1873) 7o Ill. 426.
11 In reaching this result he criticises the general view expressed by Stephen
and others that the old discredited count practice of the common law infra note
ig, which he desires to revive, was employed to state the same cause of action
in different ways; for, so he says, due to the variation in the facts, it is not the
same cause of action, but two or more different causes of action. This provides
a novel method of substantially doing away with the prohibition against joining
inconsistent causes. "Where, upon identical operative facts, a plaintiff seeks
alternative reliefs, the plaintiff has joined inconsistent causes of action. Where,
upon variable operative facts, he seeks alternative reliefs he has not joined incon-
sistent causes of action. . . . As the relief prayed for characterizes the causes
of action, identical facts calling for different reliefs are inconsistent causes of
action, but variable facts calling for the same or. different reliefs are not. The
variation in the facts prevents the inconsistency." McCaskill, op. cit. supra note
COMMENTS
Here, it is submitted, we have a pretty pickle. Probably Professor
McCaskill would say that the new or changed fact must at least be
a material one. Immediately we have our old discussion of the
materiality of the change and our illusion of certainty has gone.12  But
at any rate we do have a cause of a very limited scope. Thereupon
serious difficulties arise as to certain important and definite rules of
law, such as the rule against splitting a cause of action, the closely
connected rule of res adjudicata, the rule against setting up a new
cause of action by amendment of the complaint after the statute of
limitations has run, and so on. 13  Of course we might so much like
our definition of cause of action as to be willing to remodel all these
rules, though it would be vastly inconvenient to do so. Apparently,
however, Professor McCaskill contemplates incorporating his defini-
tion in these rules without changing them, for he inveighs against a
leading case holding that a fact once litigated in asking for a "legal"
remedy cannot be relitigated by seeking an "equitable" remedy.:"
On his theory there would here be no improper splitting of a single
cause, but there would be two separate causes. The reaches of this
doctrine are startling. Facts once litigated in one common law action
have been held settled for other common law actions.15  The same rule
was applied in equity and law cases.'6 The code tendency has, it is
z, at p. 643. You are inconsistent when you claim specific performance or
damages, but not if you put the defendant in New York and Honolulu at the
same moment.
"A similar view of the cause has been applied in Illinois with harsh andilliberal results as to amending the declaration. Walters v. Ottawa (igo9)"24o
Il1. 259, 88 N. E. 651; Clark, op. cit. supra note 2, at p. 823, note 39, 829, note* 64.
"These rules are discussed in (1924) 33 YALE, LAW JOURNAL, 817.
"Hall v. Sugo (igoi) 169 N. Y. 1O9, 62 N. E. 135, criticised in (1925) 34
YALE LAW JOuRNAL, 648-651. It is believed that a sounder view of this case is
taken in COMMENTS (1925) 34 YALE LAW JOuRNAL, 536, 541. The facts should
be considered as settled; but this should not prevent further action to enforce
the as yet unsatisfied judgment
"That judgment in trover bars claims in trespass, implied assumpsit, detinue
and replevin, see cases collected in COMMENTS (1921) 30 YALE LAW JouRNAL,
742, note 8. See also Johnson v. Odom (1914) 1I Ala. App. 364, 66 So. 853(detinue and trover); Davis & Co. v. Stukes (1923) 122 S. C. 539, 115 S. E.814 (claim and delivery and conversion); Roberts v. Moss (19o7) 127 Ky. 657,
io6 S. W. 297 (quasi-contract and trespass); Leler v. Guild (1922) 71 Colo.349, 2o6 Pac. 8o3 (tort and contract); La Vasser v. Chesbrough Lumber Co.(1916) 19o Mich. 403, 157 N. W. 74 (quantum meruit and express contract);
Orino v. Beliveau (1922) 122 Me. 168, 119 At. gg (same); but see Meirick
v. Wittemanh Co. (1923) 98 N. J. L. 531, 121 AtI. 670; Janouneau v. Wetherill
(1922) 98 N. J. L. 8o, 118 Atl. 7o7.
', See cases collected in i Cook, Cases on Equity (1923) 76-88; 2 Black, Judg-
inents (2d ed. i8gi) secs. 517, 518. See also Barnett v. Western Assur. Co.
(192o, Ark.) 220 S. W. 465; Snell v. Turner Lumber Co. (922, C. C. A. 2d)
285 Fed. 356; Medley v. Brown (1918, Tex. Civ. App.) 202 S. W. 137; Church
v. Gallic (9o5) 76 Ark. 423, 88 S. W. 979; Fitzgerald v. Heady (1916) 225
Mass. 75, 113 N. E. 844; McCreary v. Stallworth (1924, Ala.) io2 So. 52. But
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to be conceded, extended this principle in the interest of shortening
litigation.17  Are we to go violentlyk to the other extreme through
the device of cutting our cause of action up into molecules? The
asserted definition brings uncertainty rather than certainty; it renders
unsettled well-settled rules of law.'8
My final criticism is the most serious. It is that this is very defi-
nitely an attempt to resurrect old technical rules of law. The forms
of action will truly rule us from their graves. The only change is
that we may, consider them side by side in one action, rather than
successively in separate actions. The old procedural subdivisions
must be conned again to see whether the mystic formula applicable to
our case is contained in count one or in count two. The argument
made for this-outside of the one that it is a necessary deduction from
the given premises-is that the busy judge and the unlearned juror
can assimilate small bundles of facts more easily than large ones.
This idea of the practical desirability of minute subdivisions of the
case seems fundamentally unsound.19 The busy judge and the untu-
tored jury are going to look at the whole case rather than at small
details. But even if a microscopic examination of the case is to be
expected, the subdivisions looked for should be logical according to the
mental habits of the jtirors. The common law subdivisions were not
compare Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co. (19og) 132 Ky. 435, iI1
S. W. 374; Piro v. Shipley (1907) 33 Pa. Super. Ct 278. Matters which could
not be put in issue of course were not res adjudicata. See infra note 17; cf.
Harlow v. Pulsifer (1923) 122 Me. 472, 120 Atl. 621.
" This is due to the fact that all remedies are obtainable in one action and hence
the matters which may be put in issue are more numerous than before the code.
Gilbert v. Boak Fish Co. (19o2) 86 Minn. 365, 9o N. W. 767; Thompson v.
Myrick (1877) 24 Minn. 4; Waldo v. Lockhard (1917) 1O Neb. 797, 165 N. W.
154; Inderlied v. Whaley (I895, Sup. Ct. Gen. T.) 85 Hun,'63, 32 N. Y. Supp.
64o; Yager v. Bedell (1924, 3d Dept.) 2o6 App. Div. 8o3, 2O N. Y. Supp. 466;
NMagle v. Naugle (1913) 89 Kan. 622, 132 Pac. 164; Brice v. Starr (igi6) 9o
Wash. 369, 156 Pac. 12. As to the effect of the code see discussion in Perdue v.
Ward (1921) 88 W. Va. 371, io6 S. E. 874; (1922) 22 CoL. L. REv. i8o; Royal
Ins. Co. v. Stewart (igi8, Ind. App.) 121 N. E. 3o7.
'It should be noted that inherent in the new definition of cause of action is
a new and restricted definition of "right." Right is also to be tied up to, and
limited by, some ancient remedy. This does not seem desirable from the stand-
point of analysis or of convenience. Cf. Corbin, Rights and Duties (1924) 33
YALE LA W JouRNAL, 501; Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology (1919) :29
ibid. 163, 167.
'Perhaps as good a criticism as any of the idea is found in the Report of
the Common Law Commissioners in reporting the Hilary Rules (1834) as quoted
in Stephen, Pleading (Williston's ed. 1895) *lxxxii-*lxxxvi. They said inter alia
that the practice of multiplying counts and pleas "often leads to such bulky and
intricate combinations of statements, as to present the case to the judge and jury,
in a form of considerable complexity; and it is apt, therefore, to embarrass and
protract the trial, and occasionally leads to ultimate confusion and mistake in
the administration of justice." See also references Clark, op. cit. supra note 2,
at pp. 825, 826; COMMENTS (1924) 34 YALE LAw JouRNAL, 192.
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logical; they grew, like Topsy. And we are asked to spend our time
and energy in perfectirig pleadings to preserve these illogical divisions.
Has not the whole reaction from common law pleading shown both the
hopelessness and the uselessness of the task ?20
The attempted resurrection seems especially unfortunate in keeping
alive the old distinction between equity jurisdiction and legal jurisdic-
tion, one of the great blemishes of the pre-code procedure.2 1 For-.
merly we bickered over which court we should be in; now we are to
engage in the same process for the yet more unsubstantial purpose
of seeing under which part of the complaint we are to proceed.
The right of trial by jury does not force us to any such useless task.
It prescribes the form of trial, not the form of pleading. Many cases
are tried now in jurisdictions which have code pleading in its truest
sense where the question of form of trial is not raised at all. If it is
raised by a specific motion for a jury trial, then and only then is the
court called upon to decide what tribunal formerly tried this particular
kind of an issue. This narrow inquiry, often not made at all, need not
send us back to common law pleading.2 2 True, our author says that
"there is no such thing as a legal issue or equitable issue apart from a
legal or equitable cause of action." Even so, many courts are doing
extremely well in the belief that it is only the issue which in any event
may now be termed "legal" or "equitable," and which is to determine
the form of trial.
23
I suspect that in the last analysis we are far apart as to what we
expect of pleading. The true believer in the common law system,
among whom apparently we must include the learned author, thought
that it well performed its function of separating the real dispute from
all extraneous matter before the actual trial. But many of us have
had a suspicion that it did not, and the reforms of pleading have fol-
" This reaction and the causes therefor are discussed with references by the
present writer in an article, History, Systems and Functions of Pleading (May,
1925) Ui VA. L. REV. 517.
"So recognized by the codifers, First Report (1848) 68-87, 145, 146. See also
my article, supra note 2o.
- The problem is discussed at length with references to the procedure in
several states in Clark, The Union of Law and Equity (i925) 25 COL. L. REv. i.
See also Cook, Equitable Defenses (1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 645; Com-
MENTS (923) 32 ibid. 707.
In the code states where the divisions between law and equity are still main-
tained, the statutes permitting "equitable defenses" in the law actions, expressly
provide that "equitable issues" in "proceedings at law" shall be tried as formerly
in equity. See Ark. Dig. Sts. i921, sec. 1045; Iowa Comp. Code 1919, sec. 7066;
Carroll's Ky. Codes, I919, par. 11 (2) ; Or. Code, ig2o, sec. 390. Compare U. S.
Comp. Sts. i916, sec. 125ib; Plews v. Burrage (192I, C. C. A. Ist) 274 Fed.
881. How would the learned author analyze the situation in a non-code state
where an "equitable defense" is permitted to a legal action? Cf. Cook, op. cit.
supra note 22.
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lowed as a result of suspicion. We have believed that not many lawyers
were clever enough to be able to do what common law pleading
expected of them, and that those who possessed the requisite cleverness
had likewise the ability not to do it,-not to give away their case before
trial. We perhaps may even contemplate with some degree of equa-
nimity the civil and continental ideas of pleadings of a simple infor-
matory character.24 At any rate we feel that the best results may be
expected by trying merely to make the parties put on record their
stories of past doings, their versions of the past happenings which led
to the litigation. And hence our modem pleading properly empha-
sizes, not ancient legal formulae, but the stating of the facts simply
as they appear to the parties. Therefore, the accepted definition of the
code cause is one which makes the break from one cause to another
depend not on the limits of some ancient writ, but upon some apparent
break in sequence of a series of acts or events which have actually
taken place.
C. E. C.
DUE PROCESS AND THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE
The recent case of Egley v. P. B. Bennett & Co. (1924, Ind.) 145
N. W. 83o, presents the interesting problem of when, in view of the
"full faith and credit" clause of the federal constitution,1 the courts
of one state are privileged to refuse to enforce a judgment rendered
in another state.2 A survey of the Supreme Court decisions interpret-
ing this clause readily reveals that it is not every decision of one State
to which a sister state must give "full faith and credit."'  What, then,
are the circumstances in which this clause imposes a duty upon the
courts of one state to enforce a judgment of a sister state?
"* See my article cited supra note 2o. See also Millar, The Formative Prin-
ciples of Civil Procedure (1923) 18 It. L. Rlv. I, 94, 15o.
I U. S. Const. Art. 4, sec. i.
'That is, when are the courts of one state under a duty to the plaintiff to recog-
nize in him a right of action based upon a judgment rendered in another state?
Ordinarily, a state court has the power to impose duties upon the state's societal
agents. The "full faith and credit" clause is intended to enable such a court to
impose duties upon the societal agents of sister states as well.
'Cole v. Cunningham (i8go) 133 U. S. 107, IO Sup. Ct. 269; National Bank v.
Wiley (19o4) 195 U. S. 257, 25 Sup. Ct. 7o (recognition denied because the
plaintiff was not the holder of the note and therefore the proceedings were
wanting in due process); Flexner v. Farson (1919) 248 U. S. 289, 39 Sup. Ct. 97
(full faith and credit denied a money judgment because the defendant, not domi-
ciled within the state, was not personally served with process); Thomnpson v.
Whitman (1873, U. S.) 18 Wall. 457 (full faith and credit clause does not
prevent inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment);
Simmons v. Saul (i8gi) 138 U. S. 439, II Sup. Ct. 369; Old Wayne Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. McDonough (1907) 204 U. S. 8, 27 Sup. Ct. 236; Grover & B. Sewing
Machine Co. v. Radcliffe (i89o) 137 U. S. 287, 11 Sup. Ct. 92.
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In the instant case, an Illinois corporation brought an action in
Indiana upon a judgment rendered in Illinois. The suit in Illinois
had been against a resident of Indiana who was not personally served,
the action being upon a note which contained a provision authorizing
confession of judgment by an attorney in any court of record. The
note had been executed in Indiana, but was made payable in Illinois.
The Indiana court assumed that by the domestic law of Indiana such
a provision in such a note would not confer upon the attorney a
legal power by appearing for the defendant, to enter a valid judgment,'
and conceded that by the domestic law of Illinois such a provision in
such a note was valid.5 Under the circumstances the Indiana court
held that it was under a duty to enforce the Illinois judgment, and
affirmed judgment for the plaintiff.
While this result is satisfactory, the reasoning in support of it would
seem to be of doubtful soundness. Proceeding from the arbitrary rule
that the validity of a stipulation in a note providing for confession of
judgment is controlled by the law (domestic rule) of the place of per-
formance of the note, the Indiana court had no difficulty in building
up the proposition that since the note was payable in Illinois, and since
by the -law of Illinois such a stipulation in such a note was valid,
Illinois properly assumed jurisdiction of the unserved Indiana defend-
ant, and that therefore the Illinois judgment was enforceable in
Indiana. It will be noted that this entire chain of thought and result-
ing decision are founded upon the proposition that the law (domestic
rule) of the place of performance governs the validity of the stipulation
in question. But the fallacy of the reasoning is apparent upon an
'There seems to be no Indiana decision squarely in point, but there are dicta
that a provision in a note authorizing any attorney to confess judgment is void.
See Bible v. Voris (1895) 141 Ind. 569, 572, 40 N. E. 67o, 671; Irose v. Balla
(1914) 181 Ind. 491, 499, 1O4 N. E. 851, 854. There is, however, a statute author-
izing confession of judgment by an attorney, but such power of attorney must be
accompanied by an affidavit that the confession is not made to defraud creditors.
Ind. Rev. Sts. 1914, ch. i, see. 615. A power of attorney in a note lacks an
affidavit and for that reason is thought to be invalid.
In view of the statement in the instant opinion that the validity of such a
provision is to be determined by the law (domestic rule) of the place of perform-
ance, it may well be that even if action had been brought in Indiana, it would
have been sustained. The Indiana court, however, might have said that confessing
judgment was part of the performance, and if that much of the performance took
place in Indiana, the Indiana rule was applicable, even though payment was to
be in Illinois. In the instant case both phases of performance occurred in Illinois.
Whitton v. Whitton (I895) 64 Ili. App. 53; Ill. Rev. Sts. 192i, ch. x1O, sec. 88.
'That the law of the place of performance governs, see' Vennumr v. Merterw
(19o6) 119 Mo. App. 461, 91 S. W. 292. See Krautz v. Kazenstein (i9o3) 22
Pa. Super. Ct. 275. The word "law" here must be taken to mean merely the
local or domestic rule which the foreign state would in the opinion of the forum
apply to a case similar to that at bar, but not involving any foreign element. See
Cook, Legal and Logical Bases in The Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YA.LE LAW.
JOURNAL., 457.
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examination of the earlier case of Acme Food v. Kirsch7 where from
the premise that the law (domestic rule) of the place of execution should
govern, the Michigan court reached an opposite result to that reached
in the instant case and refused to give full faith and credit to the
Illinois judgment.
The obvious result of such diverse rulings is that a judgment such as
that in the instant case will be enforced in some, and not enforced in
other sister states. Surely this was not the intendment of the "full
faith and credit" clause. It would seem patent that a judgment of
one state is entitled to full faith and credit either in all or in none of
the other states. The confusion in these cases seems to result partly
from a failure to distinguish with sufficient clarity between a suit on the
note itself and an action to enforce a judgment upon the note rendered
in a sister state. In an action on the note itself no question of full faith
and credit is involved. In such an action the question of whether or
not the validity of such a stipulation in such a note is governed by the
law (domestic rule) of the place of performance or of execution may
well be the determining factor In a suit on the judgment already
obtained the only question is whether that judgment must be recognized
by the sister states, including in the instant case, Indiana, by whose
domestic law such a provision is void. If suit on the note in question had
been brought in the first instance in Indiana, the courts of that state
would have applied whatever conflict of laws rule, with respect to the
validity of such a "confession of judgment" provision, which -Indiana
had developed. That is, reasoning from the Indiana rule that in a note
nade in Indiana, to be performed in Illinois, the law (domestic rule) of
the place of performance shall govern, the Indiana court would prob-
ably have recognized the validity of the provision authorizing con-
fession of judgment, though if, as in Michigan, the conflicts of laws
rule had been that the law (domestic rule) of the place of execution
governs, the court would have refused to recognize the power. The
decision as to whether or not the provision was valid, would thus depend
upon what rule the state adopted as to what law (domestic rule) should
govern-that of the place of execution or that of the place of perform-
ance. But where the suit is on the judgment of the Illinois court the
test is solely, did the Illinois court have jurisdiction: that is, did its
rule, that in Illinois such a provision is valid, and that the place of
performance should govern and thus allow application of this rule,
give due process of law to the defendant? Assuming that Indiana
had, like Michigan, preferred a combination of rules, which would
prevent the recognition of such a provision in such a note, it is no
reason why they should say to other states, we shall enforce judgments
which you render, only if you adopt a similar combination of rules in
- * (1911) 166 Mich. 433, 131 N. W. 1123.
It
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your domestic proceedings." To counteract just such attitude was the
very aim of the "full faith and credit" clause.
Thus in the instant case there would appear to be but one valid
ground upon which the courts of one state are privileged to refuse
to enforce a personal judgment9 obtained in a sister state, viz., that the
judgment being sued on was invalid in the sister state because that
state's rule for acquiring jurisdiction was unconstitutional, as denying
"due process" of law within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-"
ment-and on that ground would have been reversed by the Supreme
Court of the United States. Apparently the Supreme Court has never
expressly stated that the only ground upon which a personal judgment of
one state may be denied recognition in another state is that the def end-
ant in the original suit was deprived of due process of law. But it
would seem that in no case where there was due process of law has
the judgment been denied the protection of the "full faith and credit"
clause. 10 And the inquiry of the courts of the states in which the foreign
judgment is sought to be enforced, as to whether or not "due process"
'At most the Indiana rule is merely that the Indiana courts will not consider
such a provision in such a note to be a submission by the defendant to the juris-
diction of Indiana; the Indiana rule does not, and cannot, say that in an Illinois
suit, such a provision will not be considered as a submission to the jurisdiction of
Illinois.
'This provision must be limited to personal judgments. Divorce decrees have
been considered apart. Likewise decrees admitting wills to probate. A finding
by the probate court that the testator was domiciled within the state will not be
binding upon the courts of other states, unless the parties were all personally
before the court. Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co. (i916) 242 U. S. 394, 37 Sup. Ct.
152. And a decree admitting a will to probate in the state of the testator's domi-
cile is not entitled to full faith and credit so as to require probate without the
privilege of contesting it in the state where the real property is located. Selle v.
Rapp, Ex'r (i92o) 143 Ark. 192, 220 S. W. 662. The "full faith and credit"
clause has been construed to mean that judicial proceedings shall have the same
effect in other courts that they have in the state of decision. Since the law of the
situs is said to control the disposition of real property, the probate of the will can
establish the validity of the will disposing of real property in that state.
°COMMENTS (i918) 28 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 264; ibid. 579. The general rule
laid down by the courts seems to be that a personal judgment of a state court
having jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter should have the same effect
in every state that it had in the state of decision although founded on a transac-
tion which in the other state would-have been invalid. Fatntleroy v. LUm (igos)
2IO U. S. 23o, 28 Sup. Ct. 641; Christmas v. Russell (1867, U. S.) 5 Wall. 290
(statute of Miss. that judgments of other states against citizens of that state shall
not. be enforced if the action would have been barred in her tribunals by her
statute of limitations infringes the "full faith and credit" clause) ; Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Harris (877) 97 U. S. 331; Hanley v. Donoghue (i885) II6 U. S.
i, 6 Sup. Ct. 242; Carpenter v. Strange (i8gi) 14i U. S. 87, 1I Sup. Ct. 96o;
Embry v. Paliner (1882) io7 U. S. 3, 2 Sup. Ct. 25; Huntington v. Attrill (1892)
146 U. S. 657, 13 Sup. Ct. 224; Maxwell v. Stewart (1874, U. S.) 21 Wall. 71
(fraud in obtaining a judgment is not a good defense to an action upon a judg-
ment in another state).
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had been observed, resolves itself, just as should the inquiry of the
Supreme Court, in every instance, it is submitted, into this single ques-
tion: did the sister state court which rendered the judgment act
reasonably in taking jurisdiction on the basis of the sum total of the
operative facts before it?
Of course, questions of "reasonableness" cannot be settled by rules
of thumb.11 But, as has already been pointed out, in dealing with facts
substantially similar to those in the instant case, state courts through-
out the country have evolved conflicting views in the determination of
the validity of a provision in a note stipulating for confession of judg-
ment. Under these circumstances, would not the selection by the
Illinois court of either of these solutions have been sufficiently reason-
able to have entitled its judgment to full faith and credit in any other
state court, regardless of the domestic rule of such other state?112 In
"Due process" as a test of whether "faith and credit" will be accorded
the judgment is in substance a requirement that a court or legislature shall not
conduct itself "unreasonably6" In'the determination of this question the tradi-
tional methods of thinking of the Anglo-American legal community play a largepart. Thus, if a giv&n procedure is sanctioned by the usages of the past, it will
apparently be recognized as "due process." Murray v. Hoboken Land andImprovement Co. (1855, U. S.) 18 How. 272; Jacknman v. Rosenbaum Co. (1922)26o U. S. 22, 43 Sup. Ct. 9. Striking illustrations are: Miedreich v. Lowenstein(1913) 232 U. S. 236, 34 Sup. Ct. 309 (a false return by the proper officer ofpersonal service within the jurisdiction was not a denial of "due process");
Owenby v. Morgan (I92o) 256 U. S. 94, 41 Sup. Ct. 433 (a Delaware rule inforeign attachment cases which conditioned the defendant's right to appear uponhis first giving special bond was not a denial of "due process" although thedefendant was unable to give such a bond and so suff&red judgment by default).New forms of procedure may apparently be introduced, provided they are not
"unreasonable." Maxwell v. Dow (igoo) 176 U. S. 581, 2o Sup. Ct. 448 (Utah
constitutional provision for trial by eight jurors instead of twelve). So, inquestions of "jurisdiction" the proceeding must be reasonable under the circum-
stances. McDonald v. Mabee (1917) 243 U. S. 90, 37 Sup. Ct. 343; Pawloski v.Hess (1924, Mass.) 144 N. E. 76o; COmmENTS (1925) 34 YALE LAW JoURNAL,
415.
'Residents of different countries may agree to refer all disputes arising
under a contract to the law of the domicile of one of the parties, and to submit
to the jurisdiction of the courts of that country without service of process ifthe law of that country authorizes such procedure. A judgment obtained in
accordance with such an agreement has been recognized by the courts of the
other country. Feyerick v. Hubbard (1902) 71 L. J. K. B. 509. Had the makerin the principal case expressly agreed to submit to the courts of Illinois without
service of process the situation would be substantially similar. It would seemthat an agreement to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of any one of a
number of states cannot well be distinguished. Whether or not this was in factthe agreement in the principal case depends upon a reasonable interpretation of
the bargain. If so, and if the doctrine of Feyerick v. Hubbard be regarded as
sound it would, seem that the Illinois judgment ought to be entitled to full faith
and credit, as constituting "due process."
On the question of the recognition of a judgment entered by confession by an
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view of the "full faith and credit" clause, it is submitted that the only
law which controls the courts of any state in rendering judgments
which will be enforceable in other states is the "law" of "reasonableness."
VALIDITY OF LIENS AGAINST A TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY
A study of American bankruptcy decisions reveals the presence of
two conflicting policies. What may be conveniently called the
"generalistic" view seems to stress the importance of an equitable dis-
tribution of the assets of an insolvent debtor among all his creditors
according to their several deserts; what may be called the "particu-
laristic" view appears to emphasize the hardship of the position of the
particular creditor before the court and to favor an exception
for his benefit, seemingly on the ground that saving him whole will
work but little loss to each of the many others. The first tendency
has apparently led to the enactment of successive bankruptcy
acts ;1 while the second has seemed to limit the intended effect of such
legislation by judicial construction; this in turn, it appears, has called
forth amendments more perfectly expressing the legislative intent. But,
admittedly, even under the former viewpoint, those who by their
superior diligence have secured their rights by legally recognized liens
are properly entitled to be first provided for. Fairness to the unsecured-
creditors, however, especially to those who have lent in reliance on the
debtor's appearance of prosperity, requires that lienors give notice to
the world of their claims in a recognized manner, such as taking
possession or, where in the nature of the transaction that it is impos-
sible, recording in the manner required by statute in the various
states.
2
What acts will create a lien sufficient to put a creditor in a
preferred class? By the "generalistic" view a lien valid betweenf the
parties, plus tlie recognized form of notice to third persons would be
considered necessary; by the "particularistic" view the former merely
attorney in another state the prevailing view seems to be that such a judgment
must be recognized. Van Norinan v. Gordon (1899) 172 Mass. 576, 53 N. E. 267;
Miller v. Miller (1916) 9o Wash. 333, 156 Pac. 8; Ashby v. Manly (1921) I9
Iowa, 113, iSI N. W. 869.
1Federal Acts of Bankruptcy were enacted in i8oo, 1841, 1867, and 1898. The
last was amended in 1903, i9o6, 19IO, 1917, and 1922. The act as amended may
be found in U. S. Comp. Sts. 1916, sec. 9585-9656; ibid. (Supp. igig); ibid.
(Supp. 1923).
'The state recording statutes make certain liehs (e. g., chattel mortgages and
conditional sales) void as to certain parties if unrecorded. The bona fide
purchaser is uniformly protected. The statutes vary greatly as to the classes of
creditors, to which, if any, the protection is extended.
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would be sufficient.' The Bankruptcy Act of I8984 left the matter
open to doubt.5 The situation is further complicated by the diversity
of the state laws as to the validity of liens both as between the parties
thereto and as against third parties." Accordingly the decisions of the
lower federal courts are in conflict, since each is not only influenced
by its own notion of justice, but is called upon to apply the unique
and often misunderstood law of a particular state. Thus pledges are
upheld by courts influenced by the "generalistic" view only if there
is actual possession in the pledgee ;7 but courts influenced by the
"particularistic" view hold a more tenuous sort of possession sufficient
for a valid pledges or reach the same result by declaring the existence
of an "equitable lien." 9  In the case of unrecorded chattel mortgages
and conditional sales, the decisions, dependent on diverse state record-
ing acts, were similarly conflicting, 0 until the Supreme Court of the
'If before bankruptcy a second creditor intervenes and secures a specific lien
of record on the same property, the unrecorded lien of the first creditor is, there-
after, by both views, of no effect. See York Mfg. Co. v. Cassell (19o6) 2oi
U. S. 344, 351, 26 Sup. Ct. 481, 483.
'Supra note i.
'Sec. 67a; U. S. Comp. Sts. 1916, sec. 9651: "Claims which for want of record
or for other reasons would not have been valid liens as against the claims of the
creditors of the bankrupt shall not be liens against his estate." Sec. 7oa; U. S.Comp. Sts. 1916, sec. 9654. "The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt... shall...be vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt, as of the day he was
adjudged a bankrupt, except in so far as it is to property which is exempt, to
all . . .property which prior to the filing of the petition he could by any meanshave transferred or which might have been levied upon and sold under judicial
process against him..."
'The Bankruptcy Act leaves the validity of liens to be determined by state law.Hiscock v. Varick Bank (19o7) 206 U. S. 28, _7 Sup. Ct. 681; In re DancyHardware Co. (1912, N. D. Ala.) 198 Fed. 336; In re Nuckols (1912, !E. D.
Tenn.) 2Ol Fed. 437.
'In re P. J. Sullivan Co., Inc. (i9x8, C. C. A. 2d, N. Y.) 254 Fed. 66o.
'In re Harvey (1914, S. D. Ala.) 212 Fed. 34o.
'Gage Lumber Co. v. McEldoumey (1913, C. C. A. 6th, Ky.) 2o7 Fed. 255.
" In the following cases involving conditional sales the property was awarded
to the trustee: (parentheses throughout indicate the persons protected by state
recording statutes) In re Smith & Sluwk (19o4, N. D. Iowa) 132 Fed. 30L(purchasers and creditors without notice); Unitype Co. v. Long (i9o6, C. C. A.6th, Ohio) 143 Fed. 315 (all subsequent purchasers and creditors); I; reFranklin Lumber Co. (i9o6, D. N. J.) 147 Fed. 852 (judgment creditors without
notice and subsequent purchasers in good faith). In the following cases theproperty was awarded to the lienor: In re McKay (1899, N. D. Ohio) i Am. B.
Rep. 292 (all subsequent purchasers and creditors); In re Hinsdale (19Ol, D.Vt.) iii Fed. 502 (attaching creditors and subsequent purchasers without notice) ;In re Kellogg (19Ol, W. D. N. Y.) 112 Fed. 52; aff'd (ioO2, C. C. A. 2d) ii8Fed. 1017 (subsequent purchasers in good faith). In the following cases involv-
ing chattel mortgages, the property was awarded to the trustee: In re Leigh(1899, D. Colo.) 96 Fed. 8o6 (all third parties); Eppstein v. Wilson (i9o6,C. C. A. 5th, Tex.) 149 Fed. 197 (creditors and subsequent purchasers for value).
COMMENTS
United States settled the matter in favor of the lienor, holding such
unrecorded conditional sales1' or chattel mortgages' 2 good against
the trustees in bankruptcy under any recording statute. This result
being inconsistent with the "generalistic" view, an attempt to remedy
the situation was made in the amendment of 19160" by giving the
trustee in bankruptcy the rights of a lien or execution creditor. This
was sufficient to settle the matter in favor of the general creditors in,
states whose recording statutes protect all creditors or all lien cred-
itors,:4 but a further amendment making the trustee a bona fide
purchaser would be necessary to accomplish this result in other juris-
dictions. 1 The amendment affects trust receipt transactions where
they are treated as chattel mortgages or conditional sales.'
6 But where
the courts, tending to favor the particular creditor, have declared such
receipts to be a peculiar kind of security unaffected by the recording
acts they are good against the trustee as before.'
7
The amendment, moreover, had no effect on the battle in another
quarter. The act provides a four months' period within which trans-
fers of the bankrupt's property are (subject to certain limitations)
In the following cases the property was awarded to the lienor: Duplan Silk Co.
'v. Spencer (19o2, C. C. A. 3d, Pa.) 115 Fed. 689 (no statute); In re Josephson
(19o2, W. D. Ga.) 116 Fed. 4o4 (no statute).
"Hewit v. Berlin Machine Works (19o4) 194 U. S. 296, 24 Sup. Ct. 69o;
accord: York Mfg. Co. v. Brewster (igo9, C. C. A. 5th, Tex.) i74 Fed. 566.
York Mfg. Co. v. Cassell, su-pra note 3; accord: In re Wade (1911, W. D.
Mo.) 185 Fed. 664.
" Sec. 47a (2) ; U. S. Comp. Sts. 1916, sec. 9631, which now reads: . . . and
such trustees, as to all property in the custody or coming into the custody of the
bankruptcy court, shall be deemed vested with all the rights, remedies, and powers
of a creditor holding a lien by legal or equitable proceedings thereon; and also,
as to all property not in the custody of the bankruptcy court, shall be deemed
vested with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a judgment creditor holding
an execution duly returned unsatisfied. .. "
" In re Savage Baking Co. (igig, D. N. J.) 259 Fed. 976 (conditional sale);
It re Schilling (1918, N. D. Ohio) 251 Fed. 966 (chattel mortgage). But
when only subsequently lien creditors are protected the trustee prevails only in
so far as he represents subsequent creditors. In re Johnson (1914, E. D. Okla.)
212 Fed. 311. And under a statute protecting only innocent purchasers the
amendment is ineffectual. Mergenthaler Linotype Co. v. Hull (1916, C. C. A.
ist, P. R.) 239 Fed. 26; contra: American Laundry Mach. Co. v. Everybody's
Laundry (1919) 185 Iowa, 760, 171 N. W. i61 (seemingly out of line with the
usual interpretation of the amendment).
"52 Collier, Bankruptcy (I3th ed. 1923) 1057, 1522.
"li re Gerstinan (19o7, C. C. A. 2d, N. Y.) 157 Fed. 549; In re Richheimer
(I915, C. C. A. 7th, Ill.) 221 Fed. 16; In re Cullen (1922, D. Md.) 282 Fed. 9w;
In re Schuttig (1924, D. N. J.) i Fed. (2d) 443.
"
T New Haven. Wire Co. Cases (i888) 57 Conn. 352, 18 Atl. 266; it re E.
Reboulin Fits & Co. (19o8, D. N. J.) 165 Fed. 245; In re Cattus (IgIo, C. C. A.
2d, N. Y.) 183 Fed. 733; In re Dunlap Carpet Co. (1913, E. D. Pa.) 2o6 Fed.
726; In re K. Marks & Co. (1922, C. C. A. 2d, N. Y.) 222 Fed. 52; In re Ford-Rennie Leather Co. (1924, D. Del.) 2 Fed. (2d) 750.
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voidable by the trustees.' That a lien valid between the parties before
the four months' period may be perfected against the trustee by record-
ing' 9 or taking possession20 within the four months is not now'disputed.22 The doubtful question is: what facts prior to the four
months are operative to create a lien which may be so perfected ?23Execution of a chattel mortgage24 or conditional sale2 - is certainly
.sufficient. Not so a mere executory contract so to do.28  Pledges,irvalid at the outset, may not be perfected within the four months injurisdictions influenced by. the ."genera listic" view;27 but where the
"particularistic" view obtains they are upheld, either frankly on the
Sec. 6ob; U. S. Comp. Sts. 1916, sec. 9644: "If a bankrupt shall have ...made a transfer of any of his property, and if, at the time of the transfer, ...and being within four months before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy ... ,the bankrupt be insolvent and the . . . transfer then operate as a preference, andthe person receiving it . . . shall then have reasonable cause to believe that theenforcement of such . . . transfer would -effect a preference, it shall be voidable
by the trustee. .. "9 Conditional sales: Bradley Clark & Co. v. Benson (i9o4) 93 Minn. 9i,' 1ooN. W. 670; it. re Bennett (192o, W. D. Mo.) 264 Fed. 533; chattel mortgages:
In re Dagwell (192o, E. D. Mich.) 263 Fed. 406.
" Conditional sales: In re Johnson (1922, N. D. Iowa) 282 Fed. 273; Frederick
v. Motors Mortgage Corp. (1924, W. D. Pa.) 1 Fed. (2d) 438; chattel mort-gages: Humphrey v. Tatman (9o5) 198 U. S. 91, 25 Sup. Ct. 567; Kettenbach
v. Walker (I919) 32 Idaho, 544, 186 Pac. 912.
' There was formerly authority contra: Copeland v. Barnes (1888) 147 Mass.388, 18 N. E. 65; In re Builders' Lumber Co. '(19o6, E. D. N. C.) 148 Fed. 244.
'The amendment of sec. 47a(2) does not prevent this result because theUnited States Supreme Court has decided that the proper construction is that thetitle of the trustee vests only on the date of filing the petition. Bailey v. BakerIce Machine Co. (1915) 239 U. S. 268, 36 Sip. Ct. 50; accord: Emerson-Bran-
tingham Implement Ca. v. Lawson (1916, S. D. Iowa) 237 Fed. 877. But seeBrigman v. Covington (I915,'. C. C 4th, N. C.) 219 Fed. 5oo, 502.
'The situation is analogous to that presented by a new promise to pay an olddebt barred by the statute of limitations. The operative facts prior to the lapse
of the statutory period are, for example, a loan of money and a promise to payit on demand. The operative fact after the statute has run is a new promise.Neither the first set of facts nor the last fact is alone sufficient to constitute a good
cause of action to-day, yet both together are sufficient. Similarly there may be a
set of facts existing before the four months' period before bankruptcy which addedto the fact of taking possession or recording subsequent thereto will create a valid
lien though neither alone is sufficient.
- Supra notes i9, 2o. The state law governs what property may be includedin the mortgage. Thompson v. Fairbanks (io5) I96 U. S. 516, 25 Sup. Ct. 306(after acquired property included under Massachusetts law).
Supra notes ig, 2o.
"Hayes v. Gibson (1922, C. C. A. 3d, Del.) 279 Fed. 812; certiorari denied(1922) 259 U. S. 581, 42 Sup. Ct. 464; In re Traut's Estate (1924, C. C. A. 8th,Iowa) 297 Fed. 458. These cases declare that an "equitable lien" was created bythe agreement before the four months' period, but that it is ineffective against the
trustee.
11n re Sheridan (1899, E. D. Pa.) 98 Fed. 406; First N. Bank v. Y&kes(2926, C. C. A. 6th, Ky.) 238 Fed. 278.
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ground that possession within the four months' period in execution of
a prior agreement for a pledge is all that is necessary,
28 or by'the
declaration of an "equitable lien.
29
Most of these lien cases can perhaps be rationalized by considering
the transactions involved from an economic rather than a legal point
of view. There seems to be a pretty clear line of cleavage dividing
from the rest of the cases those involving such transactions as are
commonly known as "enabling loans." Courts seem consistently ready
to recognize the equity of the creditor who advances the money without
which the goods would never have come into the debtor's assets,
30 even
if their position can be justified only by the use of a phrase such as
"equitable lien," which is uncertain in meaning and to which courts
in general attach varying legal consequences. The classic example of
this cleavage is the trust receipt transaction.
2 1 Those cases, placing
the trust receipt in a peculiar position of advantage free from the pro-
visions of the recording acts, 2 almost uniformly involve enabling
loans; where other loans are involved the trust ,receipt transaction
usually is classed as a conditional sale or chattel mortgage.
8 8 Similarly
when a court declares a pledge good though actual possession was taken
only within four months of bankruptcy,8" or where it declares an
"equitable lien" to accomplish the same result,8 5 an examination of the
facts of the case will usually disclose an enabling loan. The same is
true where an "equitable lien" is created to uphold a pledge when actual
and complete possession never was taken,
88 or where there was a mere
agreement to give an unnamed type of security.
37
The argument for the lender is that he is only taking out of the
bankrupt's estate what he has put in, leaving the other creditors in the
same position as if he had never existed. Not even subsequent credi-
tors, it is declared, are prejudiced under the modem system of com-
mercial credit, for nowadays credit is extended not on a basis of visible
"Atherton v. Beaman (192o, C. C. A. ist, Mass.) 264 Fed. 878.
Sexton v. Kessler (1912) 225 U. S. 90, 32 SUp. Ct. 657.
Cf. (924) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 796, criticizing adversely Farmners State
Bank of Wheatland v. North Oklahoma State Bank of Britton (1924, Okla.) 230
Pac. 914, where a purchase-money chattel mortgage recorded in a fictitious name
was upheld against a bona fide purchaser though if the mortgage had not been
for the purchase money the opposite result would have been reached.
" Trust receipts perform the same credit function as chattel mortgages, but
buyers prefer to have the former outstanding against them because they do not
create the suspicion of financial difficulty which the latter from long usage by
debtors having an unstable financial background must necessarily give rise to in




4 Supra note 28.
Supra note 29.
Supra note 9.
"Hurley v. Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Ry. (9o9 )213 U. 9. 126, 29
Sup. Ct. 466.
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assets, but on the foundation of financial statements issued by the
prospective borrower whose good faith is checked by recommendations
of previous lenders, of houses like Bradstreet which make a business
of supplying credit information, and of others who are likely to know
something of the borrower's' status. But seemingly the above argu-
ment should not be given too much weight, for it overlooks the fact
that the recommenders in the last analysis must be influenced by the
debtor's false appearance of prosperity; so that the chain of causation
is merely lenghtened one link. It moreover seems to miss the familiar
phenomenon that assets added to an estate become after a certain time
so dissolved therein as to be indistinguishable from the common mass,
after which their removal by the particular creditor -who added them
would be most inequitable.38
An interesting lien situation is the so-called "field-warehousing" con-
tract.39 . Closely related to this is the situation presented in the recent
case of Massachusetts Trust Co. v. MacPherson (1924, C. C. A. Ist)
i Fed. (2d) 769, reversing (1923, D. Mass.) 291 Fed. 676, which is a
typical example of how sympathy for the enabling lender may lead a
*'A familiar instance of this occurs when a receiver of a railroad issues
receivers' certificates for money borrowed to enable him to continue the businessfor the benefit of creditors. The certificates are given priority over mortgages
antedating the receivership.
' Under the typical "field-warehousing" contract the "warehouseman"
"leases" space on the premises of the prospective borrower and issues to him
"warehouse receipts" for the goods stored therein. These are given to thelending bank as collateral security. If. the 'warehouseman" is a financially
responsible individual, if the goods are placarded with his name and are locked
up, if the key is in the possession of a bona fide agent of the "warehouseman"
not also in the pay of the borrower, and if the goods are not removable without
surrender of the "warehouse receipt," the pledge is of course valid. Bush v.Export Storage Co. (19o4, E. D. Tenn.) 136 Fed. 918; Union Trust Co. v. Wilson
(1905) x98 U. S. 530, 25 Sup. Ct. 766. And sometimes it is so held even when
one or more of these elements is lacking. Dunn v. Train (19o3, C. C. A. ist,
Me.) 125 Fed. 221; In re Cincinnati Iron Stove Co. (igo9, C. C. A. 6th, Ohio)167 Fed. 486; Atherton v. Beaman, supra note 28. Especially when the "ware-houseman" or the lending bank has taken actual possession within the four,
months' period. MacDonald v. Aetna Ins. Co. (igi6) go Conn. 415, 97 Atl. 332;
Britton v. Union Inv. Co. (i919, C. C. A. 8th, Minn.) 262 Fed. iii. But if the
"warehouseman" is a dummy the transaction is obviously merely an attempt to
evade the recording statutes. Geilfuss v. Corrigan (1897) 95 Wis. 65i, 7o N. W.306; 4th St. N. Bank v. Millbourne Mills Co.'s Trustee (i9o9, C. C. A. 3d, Pa.)172 Fed. 177. Likewise, if the key to the "warehouse" is held by a servant of
the borrower appointed "agent" of the warehouseman for this purpose solely.
Security Warehousing Co. v. Hand (19o7) 206 U. S. 415, 27 Sup. Ct. 720. Orif the borrower has permission to use the warehoused goods and substitute others
therefor. In re Spanish-American Cork Products Co. (1924, C. C. A. 4th, Md.)2 Fed. (2d) 2o3. In such cases it has been held that the pledge is invalid against
the trustee in bankruptcy. American Can Co. v. Erie Preserving Co. (191o,C. C. A. 2d, N. Y.) 183 Fed. 96. And taking possession within the four months'
period has been held ineffective. People's Bank v. Aetna Ins. Co. (igi6) 91
Conn. 57, 98 AtI. 353.
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court to uphold a very questionable lien. A trust company took "ware-
house receipts," issued by a storage company, as collateral security
for notes of an automobile sales company given for an advance of 80o
of the purchase price of certain automobiles. The pledgee had received
these cars from the manufacturer by shipment, draft against bill of
lading. The storage company had officers identical with those of the
pledgor, was located in the same building, and had signs on the interior
thereof only. By agreement in the receipts cars were displayed in the
sales room of the pledgor (identified only by cryptic tags under the
hoods) and sold to customers, the note for each car being paid and its
receipt taken up before delivery to the customer. Within the four months
the pledgee discovered the pledgor's financial instability and took pos-
session of the cars. In a suit by the pledgor's trustee in bankruptcy the
district court gave judgment for the plaintiff, holding the possession of
the warehouse company insufficient to create a pledge, so that there
was no lien between the parties sufficiently valid to be perfected within
the four months. The circuit court of appeals reversed the judgment,
holding that an equitable lien had been created by the agreement more
than four months before bankruptcy. A forceful dissenting opinion
declared (perhaps unfoundedly) that no other court had ever gone
so far as to declare that a false recital of a pledge as collateral security
for a loan could be transmuted into an equitable lien enforceable against
a trustee in bankruptcy.
It is submitted that the dissenting opinion, representing the tendency
to favor an equitable distribution among all the creditors, expresses
the desirable view. To make an exception for the benefit of the
enabling creditor seems a strained construction of the bankruptcy
act.40 Although encouragement of enabling loans may be sound
economic policy, it would seem to be more properly made subservient
to predictability of legal relations resulting from a given state of facts.
The latter is especially important in credit transactions. It seems
unfortunate that the fairly clear intent of the Bankruptcy Act should
be defeated through the medium of the vague phrase, "equitable lien,"
an all too general tendency of the courts which is reflected in the instant
case.
"RESTRAINT OF TRADE" BY ASSOCIATED LABORERS
Any attempt to attribute a fixed meaning to the expression "restraint
of trade" is futile; for its content does little more than reflect the
emotional response of the court to the general problem of balancing
social c6nveniences in the particular case. This is brought out clearly
by a consideration of the cases in the field of labor law.' The phrase
'Cf. Archbald, Frauds and Preferences (1gio) 44 Am. L. REv. 481, 51o;
Taylor, Trust Receipts (1921) 6 CORN. L. QUART. 168, 175.
' Cf. State v. Coyle (1913, Okla. Crirm. App.) 130 Pac. 316, 320: "Labor is not
only blood and bone, but it also has a mind and a soul, and is animated by
sympathy, hope, and love; capital is inanimate, soulless matter." Etc., etc. And
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is found in cases arising under the common law--i. e. non-statutory
law-involving "combinations in restraint of trade" 2 and in similar
cases arising under the anti-trust statutes, state and federal. In the
latter class of cases the dominant question may be one of two others:
Does the statute apply to labor as well as to capital? Or is such
a statute, expressly excluding labor from its operation, unconstitu-
tional? The answer to these last two inquiries will probably depend to
a considerable extent, just as in the determination of the question
whether there is "restraint of trade," upon the emotional response of
the court. But since the expression has become a somewhat convenient.
label for a variety of unprivileged activities of associated laborers,
which may not only be factually similar, but may also produce factually
similar economic and social effects, the classification is probably not
without utility. In addition, "restraint of trade" is the best approxima-
tion to a realistic description of the class of conduct sought to be
identified; and it seems clear that the same general jjroblem of making
the most convenient adjustments in labor disputes is one which can
be solved only by a realistic understanding of the situations in which
such conduct has been so characterized by -the courts, and by a real-
istic approach to the new cases as they arise.
The problem of "restraint of trade" was presented in a novel way
in three recent cases: New Jersey Painting Co. v. Local No. 26,
Brotherhood of Painters, Etc. of America (1924, N. J. Eq.) 126 Atl. 399,
J. I Hass, Inc. v. Local No. x7, Brotherhood of Painters, Etc. of America
(1924, D. Conn.) 3oo Fed. 894, and Barker Painting Co. v. Brother-
hood of Painters, Etc. of America (1924, D. C. Sup. Ct.) 6 LAW AND
LAoR, I26.3 Each case arose out of provisions of the General Con-
stitution of the Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators, and Paperhangers
of America, that "where there is a difference between the wage scale
of two cities all members employed upon a job done in one of the two
cities by an employer from the other... shall receive the higher of the
two wages scales" ;4 and that at least fifty percent. of the employees on
a particular out-of-town job shall be from the locality in which the
work is being done.5  The District of Columbia case was brought
cf. Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923) 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394;
COMMENTS (1923) 32 YALE LA'w JOURNAL, 829.
'The present problem should not be confused with that of "contracts in restraint
of trade"; yet it will be found that "nearly every decision against a combination
assigns as one of the reasons that it is based on a 'contract in restraint of trade.'"
Black, How Far is thw Theory of Trust Regulation Applicable to Labor Unions?
(1924) II WASH. UNIV. STUDIES (Humanistic Series, No. 2) 347, 350:
'See (1924) 6 LAW AND LABOR, 147.
'In a letter from the OPEN SnoP R:EviEw (February 26, 1925), it is stated that
"while no such rule ... is embodied in their (carpenters' unions') constitutions,
yet in actual practice if a contractor takes a job in another city and the scale there
is lower than where he is permanently located, he gets the higher scale."
"In the General Constitution containing the latest amendments (March, i922)
the pertinent provisions are known as sections 132 and 133.
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apparently under the Sherman and Clayton Acts; but neither the New
Jersey case nor the Connecticut case seem to have involved any statute,
the latter case coming before the federal court probably by reason of
diversity of citizenship. The plaintiff in each case sought to restrain
the enforcement by the local union of the wage-scale provision on the
ground that it "restrained trade" among the master painters.6 In the
New Jersey case an injunction was denied;7 but one was granted in
both the District of Columbia case and the Connecticut case."
The resistance of the English courts to associations of laborers about
the middle of the nineteenth century was manifested in their declaration
in effect that they were per se in "restraint of trade." 9  Legislation
was later enacted to better the position in which labor unions thus found
themselves, and the belief was voiced that such a purpose had been
accomplished.Y However, as a result of the decision in the House of
Lords in Russell v. Amalgamated Soc. of Carpenters, Etc.12 it was
apparent that Section 3 of the Act of 1871, in the face of Section 4,
had not done much to overcome that resistance.1 3  But the present-day
condition of English organized labor has in other respects been con-
siderably improved by other remedial legislation.1 4
'In the instant cases, the out-of-town .wage-scale was, in fact, the higher.
One judge dissenting. Reversing (I923, N. J. Ch.) 122 Atl. 622.
'In the Connecticut case, Judge Thomas relied upon both the District qf
Columbia case and the New Jersey lower court decision which was reversed
by the New Jersey case subsequently to Judge Thomas' decision.
'The phrase "per se" ordinarily has a varying content of fact justifying the
classification. It is only when some of the familiar facts are lacking or never
present that one is troubled by the mere label. In the following cases the phrase,
though not used, was, it seems, implied: Hornby v. Close (1867) L. R. 2 Q. B.
153. Cockburn, C. J. said, at p. I58: "... the rules of such a society [trade union]
would certainly operate in restraint of trade..." The court relied on the dictum in
Hilton v. Eckersley (1855, Q. B.) 6 El. & BI. *47, *52. See Sayre, Cases on
Labor Law (1923) 83, note 2. See also Bryant v. Foot (1867) L. R. 2 Q. B. 161;
Farrer v. Close (1869) L. R. 4 Q. B. 602. In these cases the court refused to
entertain an action by associated laborers against a member for withholding funds.
1 (1871) 34 & 35 Vict. ch. 31, sec. 3.
"In Rigby v. Connol (188o) L. R. 14 Ch. Div. 482, the plaintiff was fined by the
union, under Rule 73, for "binding" his son in a shop where non-unionists were
employed. Jessel, M. R., said at p. 491 : "... without the Act [of 1871] it is clearly
... an association by which men are... restrained in trade . . ."; cf. Farwell,
L. J., in, Conway v. Wade [igo8, C. A.] 2 K. B. 844, 853, 854-
S[I912] A. C. 421.
"In the case cited supra note 12, a widow who sued for superannuation benefit
was denied recovery because of the character of the rules of the defendant union,
to which her late husband had belonged. Lord Robson said, at p. 44o: ". . . the
Act did not go to the length of abrogating or altering the general law against
restraint of trade ... It maintained the principles of the old law..." But Canada
has apparently adopted a more liberal attitude. See Starr v. CUae [1924] 4
D. L. R. 55, 61.
" Cf. Geldart, The Preseni Law of Trade Disputes and Trade Unions (914)
passim.
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It has been asserted that the notion obtaining in England prior to
1871 "never gained a foothold in the United States."'
15 But the
American courts have nevertheless been confronted with the similar
problem of determining whether a particular group of laborers was or
was not "in restraint of trade."'1  The anti-trust statutes play an
important r6le in the American situation, and as already stated may
present one of the two other problems: their imposed applicability
to associated laborers and their constitutionality when such groups are
expressly excluded from their operation.
ICommons and Andrews, Principles of Labor Legislation (1920) 102, io3.
"But let the labor union acquire the purpose of excluding all others except its
members from the labor market, or let the union commence .. .unfair excluding
practices .. . so as to make the labor market unfree, and the organization becomes
illegal at common law. . .'" Kale, Contracts and Combinations in Restraint of
Trade (i9i8) sec. 72. But see NoTES (1925) 25 CoL. L. Ray. 65.
"In the following cases the court found a "restraint of trade": More v.
Bennett (1892) i4o Ill. 69, 29 N. E. 888 (The parties were members of a stenog-
raphers' association. Under their rules, they might cut only against non-members.
The plaintiffs entered into an agreement with Cook County. The defendants,
knowing thereof, underbid them. The plaintiffs, not to cease work, met the bid,
and sued the defendants in assumpsit. The defendants' demurrer was sustained) ;
Froelich v. Musicians' Mut. Ben. Assoc. (19o2) 93 Mo. App. 383 (The court said,
at p. 391: "These by-laws impose . . . a most slavish observance of the most
stringent rules and regulations in the restraint of trade; ... no musician . . . in
any city of the country can find employment as a musician unless he is a member
of the association. Such a confederation and combination is a trust pure and
simple"); Kealey v. Faulkner (19o7, Cuyahoga C. P.) 18 Ohio Dec. 498; cf.
Bailey v. Master Plumbers (1899) 1O3 Tenn. 99, 52 S. W. 853 (involving an
entrepreneurs' association). Cf. Kemp v. Div. Na. 241 (1912) 255 Ill. 213, 99
N. E. 389. But the court found no "restraint of trade": Snow v. Wheeler (1873)
113 Mass. 179; cf. Herrinman v. Men-ies (i896) 115 Calif. 16, 22, 46 PAc. 730,
731, where the court said: "Combinations between individuals or firms for the
regulation of prices, and ... competition . . .are not unlawful as in restraint of
trade, so long as they are reasonable, and do not . . .create such restrictions as
to materially affect the freedom of commerce." And cf. Lohse Patent Door Co.
v. Fuelle (1908) 215 Mo. 421, 445, 114 S. W. 997, 1003.
'The following cases hold such laws unconstitutional: Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v.
Cornell (i901, C. C. D. Neb.) iio Fed. 816; cf. People ex rel. Akin v. Butler
Street Foundry & Iron Co. (19o3) 2oi Ill. 236,66 N. E. 349; C. W. & V. Coal Co.
v. People (1905) 214 Ill. 421, 73 N. E. 770; see State v. Duluth Board of Trade
(199o) 107 Minn. 506, 550, 12i N. W. 395, 413; contra: Cleland v. Anderson
(19o2) 66 Neb. 252, 92 N. W. 306; State v. Coyle, supra note i. And see
Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas (19oo) 177 U. S. 28, 20 Sup. Ct. 518;" Hunt v.
Riverside Co-Operative Club 01905) 140 Mich. 538, 548, 1O4 N. W. 40, 44;
Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State (i9o7) 48 Tex. Civ. App. 162, io6 S. W. g18,
aff'd sub nomn. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas (i9o9) 212 U. S. 86, 2g Sup. Ct.
220; State ex rel. Hadley v. Standard Oil Co. (19o9) 218 Mo. I, 37o, rT6 S. W.
902, io16. A discrimination between vendors of commodities and vendors of
labor and between vendors of commodities and purchasers of commodities has been
upheld. International Harvester Co. v. Missouri (914) 234 U. S. 199, 34 Sup. Ct.
859. Statutes excluding from their operation agricultural products or live stock
while in the hands of the producer or raiser have generally not been upheld.
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On the question of applicability, in addition to the varying attitudes
of the courts toward labor problems, the differing phraseology of the
state statutes has furnished some basis for the conflicting decisions.'
The provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 19 which is expressly
and necessarily limited to activities in interstate commerce,20 include
labor organizations: it was decided so in the famous Danbury Hatters
case,21 the force of which was soon felt.2 2  This decision was
obviously prejudicial to labor, and to the reaction following it it may
perhaps be possible to trace the passage of the Clayton Amendment.
23
Section 6 of that Amendment contains the well-known declaration that
"the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce ' 24
." and Section 20 restrains the use of the injunction among certain classes
Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. (1902) 184 U. S. 54o, 22 Sup. Ct. 431; State
ex rel. Atty.-Gen. v. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. (19o2, Tex. Civ. App.) 67 S. W.
1057; State v. Cudahy Packing Co. (1905) 33 Mont. 179, 82 Pac. 833; cf. Low
v. Rees Printing Co. (1894) 41 Neb. I27,59 N. W. 362; State v. Shippers C. &
W. Co. (19o2) 95 Tex. 6o3, 69 S. W. 58; State v. Laredo Ice Co. (19o3) 96
Tex. 461, 73 S. W. 951; Nat. Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas (19o5) 197 U. S. T15, 25
Sup. Ct 379; see Bromn & Allen v. Jacobs' Pharmacy Co. (19o2) I5 Ga. 429,
453, 41 S. E. 553, 563; contra: State ex rel. Astor v. Schlitz Brewing Co. (igoo)
104 Tenn. 715, 59 S. W. 1033. See 52 L. R. A. (N. s.) 525, note. The crux of
the whole problem was well put by McKenna, J., dissenting, in Connolly v. Union
Sewer Pipe Co., supra at p. 567, 22 Sup. Ct. at p. 442: "Government ... must
deal with the problems which come from persons in an infinite variety of rela-
tions. Classification is the recognition of those relations, and in making it a legis-
lature must be allowed a wide latitude of discretion and judgment."
" In the following cases the statutes were held applicable to associated laborers:
Webb v. Cooks', Etc. Union No. 748 (1918, Tex. Civ. App.) 205 S. W. 465;
Cooks', Etc. Local Union v. Papageorge (I92I, Tex. Civ. App.) 230 S. W. lo86;
Campbell. v. Motion Picture M. 0. Union (1922) I5I Minn. 22o, 186 N. W. 781
(see [922] 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 786)., Cf. Bailey v. Master Plumbers, supra
note 16; but contra: Robinson v. Hotel & Rest. Emp. (1922) 35 Idaho, 418, 207
Pac. 132; cf. Rohlf v. Kasemneier (igo8) 14o Iowa, 182, 1i8 N. W. 276.
Act of July 2, i8go (26 Stat. at L. 2o9).
Ibid., secs. I, 2.
Loewe v. Lawlor (1908) 2o8 U. S. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. 301. The case was a
serond time before the Supreme Court. Lawlor v. Loewe (1915) 235 U. S. 522,
35 Sup. Ct. 170. See Megaarden, The Danbury Hatters Case-Its Possible Effect
on Labor Unions (1915) 49 Ams. L. REv. 417.
'It was followed in Am. Fed. of Labor v. Buck's S. & R. Co. (iog, D. C.)
33 App. Dec. 83; but cf. s. c. (1911) 219 U. S. 58I, 31 Sup. Ct. 472) no decision
since, inter alia, dispute settled). See Nat. Fireproofing Co. v. Mason Builders'
Assoc. (19O9, C. C. A. 2d) 169 Fed. 259; Irving v. Neal (903, S. D. N. Y.) 209
Fed. 471, 476. And see Mitchell v. Hitchnzan C. & C. Co. (1914, C. C. A. 4th)
214 Fed. 685; s. c. (1917) 245 U. S. 229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65.
'Act of Oct. 15, 1914 (38 Stat. at L. 730).
" Congress here merely repeated the language found in many cases. But such a
statement is of little moment. All that any anti-trust statute contemplates, asso-
ciated laborers not being explicitly excepted by its terms, is more or less defi-
nitely delimited human conduct producing certain factual results. The inquiry
then should be: should it be privileged because 'it is indulged in by associated-
laborers?
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of persons under certain conditions.2 - But as early as 1918, Section 20
was construed as being inapplicable to strikes not entered into for the
betterment of labor conditions.26  On the other hand the United States
Supreme Court has refused to grant injunctions where the interferende
with interstate commerce was incidental and remote,
27 though it has
intimated that such relief would not be denied where the defendant had,
as it were, the "specific intent" to cause such interference no matter
whether incidental and remote or not.
28
The same phenomena that thus appear in the interpretation of the
statutes can be observed in the instant cases. But in order to pass
judgment on them, or more specifically, to determine whether or not
the practice involved is or is not justifiable, it seems necessary to make
a study of the factual situation. The data are meager. But a careful
consideration of harm suffered and benefit obtained should be prelim-
inary to any conclusion as to what ought to be the legal relations.
The defendants' argument can be stated briefly. Painting contrac-
tors in the United States fall into two classes: national and local.
National contractors do either decorative work on fine buildings or
work involving large operations. The great demand for such work
in the large cities develops journeymen painters of unusual skill and
their wages are fixed accordingly. When' a small town requires
special work, a national contractor is frequently engaged. He bases
his charges on the costs of labor in his home town, unless the local wage
is higher. He also imports a number of journeymen in his employ,
who are necessarily more skilful, to do all or part of the work. Since
the obvious effect of this would be the displacement of local journey-
men, it was found necessary to adopt the fifty per-cent. rule. And
since the wage-scale in each locality would be likely to differ, it was
also necessary, to prevent friction between the two classes of workers,
to adopt a uniform wage-scale; and the higher rate was chosen, since,
... involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of
employment unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property, or to a
property right, of the party making the application, for which injury there is no
adequate remedy at law.
" United States v. Norris (N. D. Ill.) 255 Fed. 423. And see Gasaway v.
Borderland Coal Corp. (192, C. C. A. 7th) 278 Fed. 56; see NoTs (922) 35
HARv. L. REv. 459; American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council
(1921) 257 U. S. 184, 42 Sup,. Ct. 72; Carrington, Injunctions in Labor Contro-
versies (1922) 8 VA. L. REG. (N. s.) 4oi; (1922) 8. VA. L. REV. 298.
2 United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co. (1922) 259 U. S.
344, 42 Sup. Ct. 570; United Leather Workers' Int. Union v. H. & M. Trunk Co.
(924) 265 U. S. 457, 44 Sup. Ct. 623; see NoTEs (1922) 71 U. PA. L. REv. 48;
(1924) 34 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 2o6. And see Gable v. Vonnegut Machinery Co.
(2922, C. C. A. 6th) 274 Fed. 66; Danville Local Union No. 115 v. Danville
Brick Co. (1922, C. C. A. 7th) 283 Fed. 9o9, gl1o. See 28 A. L. R. ios, note.
'Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering (92) 254 U. S. 443, 42 Sup. Ct. 172;
see NoTEs (1921) 21 COL. L. REv. 258; NOTES (92) 7 VA. L. REV. 462; (1921)
i Wis. L. REv. i86. And see' Western Union Tel. Co. v. Int. Bro. of Electrical
Workers (r904, N. D. Ill.) 2 Fed. (2d) 993.
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if the scale prevailing in the locality were lower, and were adopted, it
would be manifestly unfair to the out-of-town worker. Moreover, a
country builder, engaging a national contractor, figures on out-of-
town costs and is willing to pay accordingly.2 9
This argument does not lack plausibility. The program certainly
makes for harmony and efficiency among migratory journeymen.
Where the local wage-scale is higher, it seems that the national con-
tractor is not prejudiced.30 Where it is lower, as in the instant cases,
it is true that the national contractor has to pay the higher wage, but
he is not for that reason outbidden by the local contractor. The
national contractors are not prevented from taking the special out-of-
town jobs, for they alone are really qualified to do them. The
argument to the contrary assumes that the small town has enough
contractors who can do the special work to keep out competitors from
elsewhere. On the other hand, competition would very probably be
present, either where the locality of the work, being a city or town of
considerable size, had a qualified, or national, contractor;," or where
two national contractors were each desirous of getting the job.
It seems that the wage-scale provisions now under discussion are
a manifestation of the potency of the building-trades unions in the
community. The building crafts seem, more than other unions, to be
able to force the recognition of their demands, perhaps because of the
ability of the employer to pass the increased expense on to the con-
sumer,32 a fact which seems to explain the not-infrequent occurrence of
combinations between the unions and the employers. 33
' From the brief of the defendants-appellants in the New Jersey case, 13-16,
passim. See also ibid. 16-i9.
'Where the local wage-scale is higher, the union requirement obviously has
the effect of removing a competitive disadvantage and placing the competing
contractors on a par. (It is assumed, of course, that there really is conipetition.
See infra, p. 9o4).
=In each of the principal cases, the place was a locality of substantial size:
Newark, N. J., Atlantic City, N. J. (N. J. case); Greenwich, Conn. (Conn.
case); Washington, D. C. (Dist. of Col. case).
' "The manufacturer . . . faces the risk of being undersold or surpassed in
quality of product; his orders are contingent and variable. . . The building
contractor estimates on the basis of conditions at a definite time and place, and
passes on the bill to the owner. The manufacturer cannot pass on the bill to
any employing owner. . ." Bullard, Labor Unions at the Danger Line (1923) i32
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 721, 726.
"Building practices may be wantonly wasteful, but they have no immediate
relevancy to the contractor's welfare. He tends therefore to compromise. A
cost-plus contract is eminently desirable; it leaves him little to worry about. If
he makes an 'understanding' with Labor for mutual advantage he only succumbs
to a very human temptation." Bullard, loc. cit. supra note 32. See Nat. Fire-
proofing Co. v. Mason Builders' Assoc. supra note 22. Cf. Nat. Assoc. of
Window Glass M'f'rs. v. United States. (1923) 263 U. S. 403, 44 Sup. Ct. 148;
see (1924) 37 HARV. L. REv. 633. Cf. also Intermediate Report of the Joint
Legislative Committee on Housing (1922, N. Y.) Leg. Doe. No. 6o, p. IIp. See
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All these factors, then, should have an important bearing on the
determination of the question whether or not the programs of the unions
in the instant cases were "in restraint of trade.' 34 But the lack of other
factual data makes almost impossible the reaching of a satisfactory
legal conclusion. For instance, it would be desirable to know in what
proportion of cases in which an out-of-town job is taken there is
.competition; what percentage of a national contractor's work involves
jobs at home or in a very small community; and what percentage in a
city of substantial size with a real competitor. These questions
apparently were not before the court in the instant cases. Such cases
instance what seems to be an obvious need for some fact-gathering
machinery, the results of which might be utilized by the courts in the
solution of such questions.
further ibid. 5I (agreements between Inside Electrical Workers Union, Local
No. 3, of New York City, and employers). See ibid. 54, 55; 94 (marble
industry); ioo (plumbing); 105 (firring and lathing) ; io6 (Heating and
Piping Contracts Assoc.); lo7 (Contractors Protective Assoc.); io8 (plaster-
ing) ; io9 (stone masonry); iiO (tiling, grating, and manteling); 112 (mosaic
work); 114 (roofing); 116 (bronze and iron), (architectural iron work); 117
(metal doors and windows), (metal ceilings), (parquet flooring) ; 120 (electrical
supplies); 121 (liainting). See Final Report of the Joint Legislative Conmittee
on Housing (1923, N. Y.) Leg. Doe. No. 48, p. 6o (Nat. Building Granite
Quarries Assoc.).
""There is no reason for such a regulation." "Why the rate of wages to be
-paid the mechanic should depend on the place in which the office of the employer
is located rather than on the prevailing rate where the job is done, is explainable
-only on the theory that the unions are assuming to regulate and suppress compe-
tition between contractors and so that no contractor in one city will be able to
-compete on a job in another city. It is a thoroughly vicious regulation." Interm.
Rep., etc. supra note 33, at p. 6o. These statements are quoted in the
Final Rep., ek. suipa note 33, at p. 33. It is to be observed, however, that the
illustrative case put by the Committee is one coming within the first of the two
situations mentioned ante (see supra note 31 and text).
